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I. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of terrorist attacks against the United States, the U.S.
government has begun restricting public access to a much wider range of
government information than ever before.' Restrictions on public access
are no longer limited to classified government information that is primarily
related to national defense and foreign relations.2 The White House Chief
of Staff has issued a memorandum instructing executive agencies to
withhold "sensitive but unclassified" information from the public.3 The
memorandum, however, failed to define what information falls within this
newly created and potentially very broad classification.' At the same time,
the Department of Justice announced its new policy of creatively using
existing criminal statutes to prosecute any unauthorized disclosure of
classified government information.' If in the future the federal government
decides to aggressively prosecute all leaks of "sensitive" government
information, the chilling effect of this decision will close off even more
information to the public.
The recent prosecution of a former Drug Enforcement Administration
employee, Jonathan Randel, offers a glimpse into what kind of information
leaks the federal government is likely to prosecute in the future. In January
2003, a federal district court in Georgia sentenced Randel to one year in
prison and three years of subsequent probation6 for leaking confidential,
but unclassified information to Britain's prominent newspaper, the London
Times.7 Randel's case immediately drew international attention.8
I. See Jack Nelson, Government Secrecy: What Leaks Are Good Leaks?, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2003, at H3 (stating that, according to the Information Security Oversight Office, "[aictions to
classify documents in fiscal 2001 increased by 44% over the previous year, to 'an astounding'
33,020,887"); see alsoAdam Clymer, Government Openness at Issue as Bush Holds on to Records,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al (documenting the efforts of the Bush administration to withhold
government information from the public).
2. Until recently, the government classification systems established by executive orders
restricted public access to documents related only to national defense and foreign affairs. Exec.
Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995).
3. Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., White House Chief of Staff, to Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/
foiapost/2002foiapostl 0.htm.
4. See id.
5. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (2002), availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/
dojleaks.html; see also Jane Kirtley, Stopping the Leaks, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 1, 2002, at
62 (criticizing Attorney General Ashcroft's report for "failure to distinguish among different kinds
of leaks" of government information).
6. David Hencke & Rob Evans, Ashcroft Mole Jailedin US.: Secret DEA Files on Former
Tory TreasurerLeaked to Times, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 14, 2003, at 10.
7. See R. Robin McDonald, US. Attorney 'Sending a Message' to Those Who Leak
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Commentators claimed that the outcome of the case endangered the
media's routine practice of contacting sources within the government to
receive inside information.9 The media claimed that Randel' s sentence was
all the more egregious because the information he leaked to the London
paper allegedly could have been obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act.' ° Randel's case also stirred the debate on whether it is
appropriate to apply a criminal anti-theft statute to the unauthorized
disclosure of confidential government information. Specifically, some
commentators questioned whether such application creates, by operation
of law, an official secrets act."
This Note explores whether leaks of confidential government
information constitute theft of government property for purposes of a
criminal anti-theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641.2 Specifically, this Note
analyzes the case law applying § 641 to leaks of confidential government
information and demonstrates that prosecutors often succeed in sustaining
convictions for unauthorized disclosure of government confidences under
Information, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 15, 2003, at I. Specifically, the article in the
London Times "concerned the Belize Bank holdings of Lord Michael Ashcroft, who was at the time
the treasurer of Great Britain's Tory Party." Celia Bhattacharya, The Price ofInformation,MEDIOS
Y LIBERTAD DE EXPRESION EN LAS AMERICAS (Feb. 3, 2003), at http://www.libertadprensa.org/price-eng.html. Randel leaked to the Times "parts of Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) files indicating that drug smugglers were laundering money using" accounts at the Bank of
Belize-the bank that Lord Ashcroft controlled. Id.
8. See Hencke & Evans, supra note 6.
9. See id. (quoting the London Times' legal adviser: "The judge's sentence on this man
[Randel] is monstrous. Journalists talk to all sorts of people like MI5, M16 [the UK's intelligence
services], customs, and we don't expect them to be banged up for it.").
10. See Conal Walsh, The Times, the Agent, andthe Tory Peer, OBSERVER (London), Aug.
II, 2002, at 4.
11. See Government Information as Property, SECRECY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2003), at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2003/01/011603.html (quoting a former CIA analyst, Allen
Thomson: "Why bother with an Official Secrets Act with this thing [18 U.S.C. § 641] on the
books?").
12. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2003) states:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use
of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher,
money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States
or any department or agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his
use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or
converted-Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $1,000, he
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
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what is "at bottom a larceny statute."' 3 This Note also presents a number
of arguments why courts should not apply § 641 to leaks of confidential
government information. First, this Note argues that, in the context of
criminal law, the government might have only a regulatory, rather than a
proprietary interest in its confidential information. Second, application of
a criminal anti-theft statute to leaks of government information
contravenes the existing statutory scheme of criminal sanctions. This Note
raises a number of policy issues including the argument that the broad
interpretation of § 641 endangers the media's ability to conduct
independent investigations into government actions. Finally, this Note also
calls for a legislative amendment to § 641.
II. SPLIT AMONG CIRCUITS ON WHETHER A CRIMINAL ANTI-THEFT
STATUTE APPLIES TO LEAKS OF CONFIDENTIAL
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

One of the first prosecutions under § 641 for an unauthorized
disclosure of confidential government information occurred in the early
1970s when the government charged Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo
for leaking secret CIA reports to the New York Times and the Washington
Post.4 A federal district court dismissed criminal charges against the two
famous whistle-blowers, explaining its decision by "the totality of
government misconduct, including the suppression of evidence, the
invasion of the physician-patient relationship, the illegal wiretapping, the
destruction of relevant documents and disobedience to judicial orders."' 5
The court dismissed the charges, however, only after the Supreme Court,
in the highly publicized Pentagon Papers case, had denied the
government's request to enjoin the news media from publishing the reports
that Ellsberg and Russo had leaked. 6
Several federal circuits came to conflicting results in cases involving
leaks of confidential government information. Some circuits, including the
Second Circuit, upheld convictions for theft of government property when
a governmental employee leaked confidential government information to
third parties.' 7 Other circuits, most notably the Ninth and Fourth Circuits,

13. John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After
McNally and Carpenter and the EnduringProblem of Overcriminalization,26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
121, 141 n.67 (1988).
14. See Melville B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left
Undecidedin the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311, 311 (1974).
15. Id. (quoting from the court's oral statement explaining its grounds for dismissing the
suit). Melville Nimmer appeared as an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus
curiae, in Russo. Id. at 311 n.5.
16. See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
17. See infra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
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refused to apply a criminal anti-theft statute to an unauthorized disclosure
of government information. 8 This Part analyzes the key cases in which
courts have addressed the question of whether the government has a
property interest in its confidential information and, if so, whether
individuals who leak that information could be convicted for theft of
government property under § 641.9
0 that the
In 1979, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Girard"
government has a property interest in law enforcement information
contained in the computerized database of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA).2" The court also held that the use of that
information "in an unauthorized manner" amounted to "conversion"
proscribed by § 641.22 In Girard,a DEA agent sold, for $500 per name, the

18. See infra notes 35-61 and accompanying text.
19. One of the first cases touching upon this question was United States v. Friedman, 445
F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971). In that case, the Ninth Circuit upheld a conviction under § 641 for the
unauthorized private copying of secret grand jury transcripts. Id. at 1078. The defense challenged
the jury instruction stating that, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, information
contained in grand jury transcripts was "[g]overnment property regardless of who may be said to
own the particular sheets of paper or tapes on which said information is recorded." Id. at 1087
(quoting the jury instructions). The defense argued that the question of whether the information at
issue was government property was an element of the offense under § 641 and, therefore, should
have been submitted to the jury rather than decided as a matter of law by the judge. Id. Without
much discussion, the Ninth Circuit upheld the jury instruction. Id.
In Friedman, unauthorized copies of grand jury transcripts were made on private copying
equipment, id. at 1079, therefore making impossible the finding of a technical larceny of
government copying supplies. In other cases, where unauthorized copies are made during office
time and by using the government copying equipment and paper supplies, courts do not need to
address the status of information as government property. For instance, in United States v. DiGilio,
538 F.2d 972, 977 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit held that unauthorized copies were government
"records" for purposes of § 641, which specifically prohibits the records' theft. 18 U.S.C. § 641
(2003). In DiGilio, an FBI secretary sold unauthorized copies of the FBI investigative records to
the subject of the investigation. 538 F.2d at 976. At trial, the defendant argued that § 641 did not
apply because the misconduct did not deprive the government of the use of information contained
in the documents. Id at 977.
The court recognized that the government would not have prosecuted the case but for the
informational content of the copied documents. Id. at 978. The court, however, chose not to address
the question of "whether appropriation of information alone falls within § 64 ." Id. Instead, the
court held that the duplicate copies in question constituted tangible government records because
the defendant made them by using "government time, government equipment and government
supplies." Id. at 977. Section 641 specifically prohibits the theft of government records. § 641. The
court stressed, however, that "[a] statute like § 641 which prohibits the theft of any government
property of any kind does indeed.., vest considerable discretion in the Department of Justice with
respect to selective enforcement." DiGdio, 538 F.2d at 978. But according to the court, "the
solution to that problem" lay with the legislature. Id.
20. See 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1979).
21. Id. at 71.
22. Id.
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names of government informants to people who were involved in
smuggling a planeload of marijuana from Mexico to the United States.23
At trial, the agent advanced two main arguments. First, he argued that
§ 641 proscribed the theft of tangible documents embodying government
information and therefore did not encompass a mere transfer of
information.24 Second, he challenged the constitutionality of §641 on First
Amendment grounds, claiming that the statute was vague and overbroad.
The trial court held that the statutory phrase "any record.., or thing of
value of the United States" covered not only tangible government records,
but also the contents of those records.26 The court explained that
government documents often "have little value apart from the information
contained in them. 27 Consequently, the court saw "no reason to restrict
the scope of § 641 to the theft of government paper and ink, or to
unauthorized reproduction. 28
At the same time, the court recognized that, in applying § 641, courts
have to balance the government's interest in secrecy against the First
Amendment interest in disclosure., 29 The court addressed this First
Amendment concern by construing § 641 to prohibit only those transfers
of information banned by other federal statutes, administrative regulations,
or... "longstanding government practices., 30 Because the DEA's Agents
Manual specifically prohibited the disclosure of undercover agents'
identities "to any person known or suspected to be involved in the narcotic
or drug traffic," the court held that, under the circumstances of the case,
the statutory mandate of § 641 was neither vague, nor overbroad. 3 ,
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision, praising it as
"well-reasoned. 32 The court stressed that the misconduct at issue did not
involve the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.33 The court also added

23. Id. at 70.
24. See United States v. Lambert, 446 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1979).
25. See id. at 896-97.
26. Id. at 895. The court relied on Morissettev. UnitedStates, 342 U.S. 246, 270 n.28 (1952),
in which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that § 641 applied to "acts which constituted larceny or
embezzlement at common law and also acts which shade into those crimes but which, most strictly
considered, might not be found to fit their fixed definitions." Id.
27. Lambert, 446 F. Supp. at 895.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 898.
30. Id. at 899.
31. Id. at 900. But see United States v. McAusland, 979 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
that disclosure of confidential government information need not be proscribed by specific
government regulations and that circumstantial evidence of defendants' actual knowledge of the
information's confidential status was sufficient for conviction under § 641).
32. United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1979).
33. See id. at 71.
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that § 641 extended beyond the common law of theft and applied to any
use of government property, including
confidential government
34
information, "in an unauthorized manner.
At least two circuits, however, have refused to adopt such a broad
interpretation of § 641. In United States v. Tobias, the Ninth Circuit held
that § 641 did not apply to intangible goods, such as confidential
government information." The court explained that limiting the statute's
scope only to tangible goods had "the advantage of avoiding the [F]irst
[A]mendment problems., 36 At the same time, the court upheld the
conviction under § 641 for the unauthorized sale of the Navy's
cryptographic cards, explaining that the cards themselves did not contain
any information and, therefore, were tangible property for purposes of
§ 641. 37
A much stronger stand against applying § 641 to government
3
information was taken by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Truong. 1
In this case, the Fourth Circuit held that the application of § 641 to leaks
of government information contradicted "the congressional design"
governing disclosure of particular types of government secrets.39 In
Truong, a Vietnamese-American scholar was charged under the Espionage
Act, the Internal Security Act, and § 641 for delivering copies of
diplomatic cables and other classified U.S. government papers to the
Vietnamese government.4 ° Truong obtained the copies from an employee
of the U.S. Information Agency who surreptitiously copied the documents
and removed their classification markings.4
The Fourth Circuit identified two main problems with applying § 641
to leaks of government information. First, the court wrote that the
imprecise language of the statute "threaten[ed] to impinge upon rights
protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment" by restricting disclosure of
information that "form[ed] the basis of much of the discussion of public

34. Id.; see also United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 682 (6th Cir. 1985) (relying on Girard
and holding that the imprinted carbon sheets used in the typing of secret grand jury documents were
"things of value" for the U.S. government and their unauthorized sale constituted an unlawful
conveyance of government property under § 641). The Sixth.Circuit did not address the merits of
the First Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of Section 641 because, according to the
court, the "speech activity" was de minimis in the case. See id.
35. 836 F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1988). "[W]e... construe section 641 as being generally
inapplicable to classified information." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 452.
38. 629 F.2d 908, 923-28 (4th Cir. 1980).
39. Id. at 926.
40. Id. at 911-12.
41. Id.
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issues."42 Specifically, the court pointed out that the statute did not contain
a precise standard for "the exercise of discretion by upper level
government employees when they decide
'4 3 whether to forbid or permit the
disclosure of government information."
Second, the court held that application of § 641 to leaks of government
information would be inconsistent "with the congressional framework of
criminal statutes explicitly directed at classified information."44 The court
stressed that, unlike the provisions in the Espionage Act and the Internal
Security Act, § 641 did not contain a requirement of purposeful
misconduct, was not limited to specific categories of confidential
information, and punished all persons, rather than only government
employees or those who delivered the information to foreign agents.45
Therefore, the court concluded, the broad reading of § 641 could "greatly
alter [the] meticulously woven fabric" of existing criminal sanctions by
"sweep[ing] aside many of the limitations Congress had placed upon the
imposition" of penalties for leaks of classified information.46
In UnitedStates v. Morison, however, the Fourth Circuit retreated from
its strong stand against applying § 641 to confidential government
information. 47 In this case, the Fourth Circuit held that a naval intelligence
analyst, Samuel Morison, violated the Espionage Act and § 641 when he
took top-secret satellite photographs of a Soviet military ship from the
desk of another employee, removed their security markings and mailed
them to Jane'sDefence Weekly-a British publication on naval operations
with which the analyst sought employment.4 Morison also mailed to
Jane's portions of two naval intelligence wires classified as secret.49

42. Id. at 925.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 926. Specifically, the court stated that § 641 should not be interpreted as a broad
prohibition against the leaks of government information "when Congress has chosen to enact a
series of criminal statutes directly aimed at classified information." Id. at 926 n. 18.
45. Id. at 926-27.
46. Id. Judge Winter, who wrote the opinion for the court, stated:
In sum, because a criminal prohibition against the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information would be inconsistent with the existing pattern of criminal
statutes governing the disclosure of classified information and because Congress
has always refused to enact a statute like § 641 applicable to the disclosure of
classified information, I would hold that § 641 cannot be interpreted to punish the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Id. at 928.
47. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1076-77 (4th Cir. 1988).
48. Id. at 1060-6 1.
49. Id. at 1076.
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The court distinguished Morison from Truong by stressing that
Morison stole the original naval photographs and wire reports, instead of
making copies.5" The court held that both the photographs and wire reports
constituted tangible objects and thus fell squarely within the scope of the
anti-theft provisions of § 641 " The court also pointed out that Morison's
actions were motivated by self-interest in securing employment with
Jane's,rather than "by zeal for public debate. 5 2 Consequently, according
to the court, Morison's misconduct represented "a textbook application of
the crime set forth in section 641."" The question that the Morison court
left unanswered was whether § 641 would apply to the unauthorized
transfer ofcopies ofconfidential government documents, rather than of the
original documents themselves.54
The Fourth Circuit answered this question in the affirmative in United
States v. Fowler." In Fowler, Boeing Aerospace Co. hired a former
Department of Defense employee, Richard Fowler, who obtained copies
of classified Department of Defense documents and incorporated
information from them "into his.., activity reports to Boeing. 56 At trial,
Fowler argued that § 641 did not apply to his misconduct because "he did
not acquire the original documents but only copies of them."57 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument and held that copies of classified
government documents also constituted "tangible property of the United
States."58 Furthermore, the court stated in dicta that, even if prosecutors
charged Fowler only with the unauthorized disclosure of government
50. See id. at 1077. "This case does not involve copying; this case involves the actual theft
and deprivation of the government of its own tangible property." Id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
[T]he defendant in this case was not fired by zeal for public debate into his acts
of larceny of government property; he was using the fruits of his theft to ingratiate
himself with one from whom he was seeking employment. It can be said that he
was motivated not by patriotism and the public interest but by self-interest.
Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. At the same time, the court implied that it would have found a violation of section 641
even if the case involved only intangible information. Specifically, the court stated that the
Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), has "largely...
clarified" whether information constituted property "which may be the subject of statutory
protection under section 641." Morison, 844 F.2d at 1077. In Carpenter, the Court held that
confidential business information was property for purposes of federal mail and wire fraud statutes.
Carpenter,484 U.S. at 28.
55. 932 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1991).
56. Id. at 308-09.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 310.
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information, the court likely would have found a violation of § 641 . The
court explained this statement by pointing to Carpenterv. United States,60
in which the Supreme Court held that confidential business information
belonging to a private entity was "property" for purposes of the federal
mail fraud statute. 6'
The above discussion illustrates the uncertainty surrounding the
question of whether unauthorized disclosures of government information
fall within the purview of the criminal anti-theft statute, § 641. To date,
there has been no U.S. Supreme Court decision providing a definite
answer to this question. As long as Tobias remains good law in the Ninth
Circuit, there is a split among the circuits. The Ninth Circuit holds that
§ 641 does not apply to intangible property, including confidential
government information. 62 To the contrary, the Second Circuit holds that
an unauthorized disclosure of confidential government information
constitutes theft of government property under § 641 .63 The Fourth
Circuit's dicta in Fowler indicates the court's inclination to agree with the
Second Circuit's holding. 64 At the same time, the Fowler court mainly
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter.5 However, since
Fowler was decided, the Supreme Court has held that, in the context of
criminal law, some governmental interests are purely regulatory in
nature. 666 Therefore, it is at least arguable that the government's interest in
keeping information confidential is not a property interest, but a regulatory
interest. 67 As such, it would not be protected by the anti-theft provisions
of § 641. Consequently, the outcome of future cases in the Fourth Circuit
remains unclear.
Finally, federal circuits that have never been asked to apply § 641 to
leaks of government information are facing a crossroads. The precedents
from the Second and Fourth Circuits are not binding on other federal
courts of appeals, and therefore, a defendant would have an opportunity to
argue that § 641 should not be interpreted as proscribing unauthorized
disclosures of government information. The next sections explore the
arguments that a defendant could make in these future cases.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id.
Id.
See Carpenter,484 U.S. at 28 (1987).
See supratext accompanying notes 35-37.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 22 (2000).
See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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III. PROPERTY INTERESTS IN CONFIDENTIAL
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

A. Intangible PropertyRights in Information
The analysis of case law applying § 641 to leaks of government
information shows that courts agree that the government has property
rights in tangible objects embodying confidential information-for
instance, in Navy cryptographic cards, secret satellite photographs, and
paper copies of confidential documents. The circuits disagree, however,
on whether property rights attach to the informational content that may be
embodied in tangible government documents, and consequently, whether
leaks of government information constitute theft of property under § 641.
Critical to this discussion is the notion that, even though property rights
may exist in a tangible copy of a document, they do not necessarily extend
to the document's contents. 68 For instance, a person may acquire property

rights in a specific copy of a book by purchasing it at a bookstore.
Ownership of the book, however, does not give the purchaser property
rights in the book's contents that may belong to the author, the publisher,
or may reside in the public domain if the term of copyright protection has
expired. Similarly, just because the government has property rights in
tangible copies of confidential documents does not necessarily mean that
it has exclusive property rights in the confidential information itself.
One of the reasons for distinguishing between property rights in a
tangible document and its informational content is the unique nature of
information. Information exists apart from any of its physical
manifestations: an idea, for instance, could be communicated without ever
being expressed on paper.69 As a result, it could be hard for information
owners to exercise one of the most essential property rights-the right to
exclude others from possessing and using the information.7" Also, unlike
physical objects, information can be possessed and used simultaneously
by an unlimited number of people. 7 Consequently, the owner of
information continues to possess it even after it has been transferred or
leaked to others. This also means that, once taken, information cannot be

68. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 272 (2002) (distinguishing

between the tangible object in which information may be embodied and the information itself).
69. Cf Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development ofIntangible
Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 683, 684-85.

70. See id.
71. See id.
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returned, which makes some traditional property law remedies, such as a
turnover of the stolen property, inapplicable to information leaks. 7 2
Policy considerations also play a role in defining property rights in
information. Justice Brandeis once stated that knowledge, conceptions, and
ideas, once voluntarily communicated to others, should be "free as the air
to common use."7 3 This statement reflects a deeply-held belief that the free
flow of information promotes scientific and cultural progress.74 The
argument for unfettered public access is particularly strong in the case of
government information that is critical to democratic self-governance.75
Both federal and state governments have enacted freedom of information
acts securing public access to government records and meetings. 76 At the
same time, recognition of property rights in government information may
unduly restrict public access to information about government activities.
Still, courts have held that property rights can exist in information.
These rights, however, are not absolute. For instance, in International
News Service v. Associated Press, the Court relied on the laws of
misappropriation and unfair competition to hold that the Associated Press
acquired a quasi-property interest in its news stories by expending "labor,
skill, and money" in gathering information about current events.77 The
Court explained that, without the right to exclude competitors from
misappropriating its news stories, the Associated Press would have no
incentive to invest in gathering and distributing the news. 7' At the same
time, the property interest recognized by the Court was limited in

72. See id.
73. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. Free access to information is an underlying policy in many intellectual property laws. For
instance, to receive a patent, inventors have to provide the U.S. Trademark and Patent Office with
"a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art ...to make and
use the same." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002). Similarly, to receive a copyright registration, an author has
to submit to the U.S. Copyright Office "complete copies" of his or her work or a phonorecord. See
17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2002).
75. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-

GoVERNmENT (1948).
76. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 522b (2003). For a complete
compendium of information on every state's open meetings and public records laws, see THE
REPORTERS COMMITrEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, TAPPING OFFICIALS' SECRETS (4th ed. 2001),

availableat http://www.rcfp.org/tapping.
77. 248 U.S. at 239.
78. Id. at 240-41. The Court thus relied on the Lockean theory that property rights arise as
a reward for labor. See JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of
Civil Government, in SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett

Publishing Co. 1980) (1690) ("Whatsoever [the man] removes out of the state that nature hath
provided.., he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property.").
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scope-specifically, the Court held that the Associated Press had exclusive
rights in its news stories vis-A-vis its competitors, but not against the
public.79

The Court's decision in a copyright case, Feist Publications,Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service,8" has further limited the InternationalNews
Service holding.8 In Feist, the Court rejected the argument that property
rights in information may arise by way of expending time and money in
its collection and gathering.8" In the case, a publisher of phone directories
sought to enjoin its competitor from copying names and phone numbers
from the publisher's white page listings.83 The Court, however, refused to
issue the injunction, ruling that copyright protection did not extend to
purely factual information, no matter how much money and effort went

79. The Court explained:
The question here is not so much the rights of either party as against the public but
their rights as between themselves .... For, to both of them alike, news matter,
however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock
in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and
money, and to be distributed and sold to those who will pay money for it, as for
any other merchandise. Regarding the news, therefore ... we hardly can fail to
recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi
property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the public.
Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236.
80. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
81. Id. at 363-64 (holding that a company does not acquire exclusive rights in information
by way of expending time and money in the process of acquiring it); see also Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2nd Cir. 1997) (holding that "transmission of real-time
NBA game scores" via Motorola's pagers "did not constitute a misappropriation" of the NBA's
property under InternationalNews Service).
The Motorola court has limited the "hot-news" InternationalNews Service claims to cases
where:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the information is
time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant's use ofthe information constitutes free-riding on
the plaintiff's efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct competition with a product or
service offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on
the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the
product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened.
Id. at 845.
82. 499 U.S. at 352-55 (rejecting the "sweat of the brow" doctrine according to which
"copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into compiling facts").
83. Id. at 343-44.
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into gathering the data. 4 Facts and ideas "'are free for the taking,"' 85 the
Court stated.
State trade secrets statutes present another example of laws recognizing
limited property rights in information.86 A trade secret owner has the
"property" right to prevent unauthorized use and disclosure of a trade
secret by persons who owe a contractual, confidential or other duty to the
owner.87 However, legal protection of trade secrets is limited. For instance,
an owner has to demonstrate that he or she has taken reasonable measures
to keep the information secret.88 Also, legal protection evaporates as soon
as a trade secret becomes publicly known,89 even if this happens as a result
of an illegal disclosure.9"
Consequently, courts have recognized limited property rights in
information under laws such as misappropriation, unfair competition,
copyright, and trade secrets law. Some legal scholars, however, have
argued that, in the context of criminal law, courts should not enforce
property rights in government information, unless explicitly instructed by
a relevant criminal statute. 9'

84. Id. at 353 (stating that "no one may copyright facts or ideas").
85. Id. at 349 (quoting Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1868 (1990)).
86. See I ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (1993); see also
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (stating that whether or not trade
secrets are property, and hence subject to the protection of the Fifth Amendment, depends on the
controlling state law).
87. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 86, § 12.02.
88. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002 (stating that property rights in atrade secret depend
on whether "the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others").
89. Id. (stating that "[i]nformation that is public knowledge.., cannot be a trade secret").
90. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995) (denying
the "trade secret" status to documents that were posted, without authorization, on the Internet for
more than ten days). While many agree that trade secrets are a form of property, albeit one with
many limitations, some courts and commentators are reluctant to characterize trade secrets as
property at all. See DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 330-33 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that Maryland does not recognize the property interest in trade secret rights); see also N.
Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that, under Illinois
state law, "trade secret, unlike a patent or a copyright, has no proprietary dimension"); John
Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHO ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962) ("It is, indeed, a strange form of 'property'
that disappears when the information it embraces becomes public or others independently make the
same discovery, and the protectability of which depends upon the circumstances of disclosure and
use.").
91. See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 69, at 732.
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B. ConfidentialBusiness InformationAs a Species of Property
The Supreme Court considered the status of confidential information
under a criminal anti-fraud statute in Carpenter v. United States.92 In
Carpenter,the Court held that, for purposes of federal mail and wire fraud
statutes, confidential business information constituted property that could
be stolen. 93 In the case, a Wall Street Journalreporter, who wrote a daily
column discussing stocks and providing investment advice, communicated
the contents of the column, prior to publication, to a brokerage firm.94 The
firm bought and sold stocks based on the column's anticipated impact on
the stock market.95 The Court ruled that the prepublication content of the
column constituted confidential business information and, as such, was the
Journal's"property. '96 "Confidential business information has long been
recognized as property," the Court stated.97 Relying on InternationalNews
Service, the Court also ruled that the Journal had the right to exclude
others from using its prepublication information.9" Consequently, by
revealing the contents of the columns prior to publication, the reporter
deprived the Journal"of its right to exclusive use of the information."99
The Court held that the violation of this right was sufficient to convict the
reporter of criminal fraud, without requiring the Journal to show that it
suffered any monetary loss.'0 0
Legal scholar John Coffee, Jr. has characterized Carpenter'soutcome
as an "extraordinary" doctrinal step, because the Court eliminated any
need for the showing of actual or intended economic injury in prosecutions
under the criminal anti-fraud statutes.10 ' Specifically, Coffee stated that,
under Carpenter, courts might impose criminal sanctions against
employees who leak confidential information of their employer, regardless
of whether the employer had suffered any monetary loss.'0 2 Coffee also
warned that future courts may use Carpenteras a precedent for deciding

92. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
93. See Carpenter,484 U.S. at 26.
94. Id. at 22-23.
95. Id. at 23.
96. Id. at 25.
97. Id. at 26. "Confidential information acquired or complied by a corporation in the course
and conduct of its business is a species of property to which the corporation has the exclusive right
and benefit, and which a court of equity will protect through the injunctive process or other
appropriate remedy." Id. (quoting 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 857. 1, at 260 (rev. ed. 1986)) (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 26.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 26-27.
101. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 130.
102. Id.
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cases under other criminal statutes including § 641.03 Consequently,
Coffee argued, Carpenter's holding might lay the groundwork for
prosecuting government employees when they leak
confidential
4
government information to the press and to the public'1
C. Government's RegulatoryInterest in ConfidentialInformation
Whether the Court's holding in Carpenter applies to leaks of
confidential government information remains unclear because the Court
has never explicitly stated that the government has property rights in its
information. However, Coffee's point may be valid because, over the
years, the Court has upheld the government's interest in preserving the
confidentiality of its information. For instance, in the PentagonPapers
case, the Justices spoke in very strong terms about the government's duty
"to protect the confidentiality" of information regarding international
relations and national defense.'0 5 Justice Stewart stated in his concurring
opinion that "[u]ndoubtedly Congress has the power to enact specific and
appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and preserve
government secrets."' 0 6 Justices White and Stewart stated that even the
First Amendment would not shield the press from subsequent criminal
sanctions for publicly disclosing secret government information.0 7
Similarly, the Court has upheld the fiduciary duty of government
employees to abide by the terms of their confidentiality and non-disclosure
agreements. For instance, in Snepp v. United States,' the Court held that
a former CIA agent breached his fiduciary duty to the CIA by publishing,
without prior authorization, an account of CIA activities in South
Vietnam.0 9 The Court imposed a constructive trust for the government's
benefit on the proceeds from the sale of the book and issued an injunction
requiring the former CIA agent to submit his future writings to the CIA for
prepublication review."' The Court explained that the government had "a
compelling interest" in preserving the confidentiality of its national
security information and that the nondisclosure agreement was "a
reasonable means" of protecting that interest."'
Still, neither the Pentagon Paperscase nor Snepp involved criminal
sanctions, thus leaving open the question of whether confidential

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
11.

Id. at 137 n.58.
Id. at 140-41.
See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at730.
See id. at 733 (White, J., concurring).
444 U.S. 507 (1980).
Id. at 510.
Id.at 509, 515-16.
Id.at51On.3.
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government information is a species of property protected by criminal
anti-theft laws. It could be argued, for instance, that the government's
interest in preserving the confidentiality of its information is purely
regulatory and thus does not come within the purview of criminal antitheft statutes. This argument is bolstered by Clevelandv. United States, in
which the Supreme Court held that, under the federal mail fraud statute,
the Louisiana state government did not have a property interest in video
poker licenses." 2 In Cleveland, federal prosecutors argued that a person
who lied on his application for a state video poker license deprived the
Louisiana government of "property.""' 3 The prosecutors claimed that the
state's interest in the licenses was proprietary because the state received
money in exchange for licenses and exercised "significant control over the
issuance, renewal, suspension, and revocation of licenses.""' 4
The Court rejected the prosecutors' argument and held that the state's
"core concern" in establishing the licensing scheme was purely
regulatory."' According to the Court, the state of Louisiana issued gaming
licenses not for commercial purposes, but rather to ensure that gaming
activities within the state were conducted "honestly, and ... free from
criminal and corruptive elements."" 6 The Court also stated that the state's
exclusive control over licenses, standing alone, was not sufficient to create
a property interest in these licenses."'
Similarly, it can be argued that the core concern of the federal
government in accumulating a wide variety of information is purely
regulatory. By gathering medical, scientific, and law enforcement
information, government agencies do not pursue commercial goals;
confidential government information is not meant for sale. Rather, by
collecting the information, the government acts for the public good. It
pursues social goals, such as providing for the security of the nation and
enforcing the rule of law. Consequently, under Cleveland, the mere fact
that the government claims exclusive control over its confidential
information is not enough to create a property right in that information.
The above discussion shows that courts have enforced property rights
in information in the context of non-criminal laws such as
misappropriation, unfair competition, and trade secrets statutes. The
Supreme Court also has held that, for purposes of a criminal anti-fraud
statute, at least confidential business information belonging to a private

112. 531 U.S. 12, 15(2000).
113. Id. at 16-17.
114. Id. at 21-22.
115. Id. at20.

116. Id. at 20-21 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:306(A)(i) (West 2000)).
117. Id. at 23.
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entity constitutes a species of property."'8 It can be argued, however, that
courts should differentiate between the interests that the government and
private entities have in their confidential information. Arguably, private
entities are primarily concerned with pecuniary interests, while the
government pursues mainly regulatory goals in gathering confidential
information. Also, as one scholar suggested, equating leaks of government
information to the criminal theft of government property might create, by
operation of law, an Official Secrets Act-something that has never
existed on this side of the Atlantic." 9
IV.

STATUTORY DESIGN GOVERNING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AGAINST
LEAKS OF CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

A. Failureof the CongressionalAttempt to Enact Official
Secrets Legislation
Unlike the United Kingdom, 2 ' the United States presently has no
Official Secrets Act-a comprehensive statute that prohibits leaks of all
confidential government information, irrespective of the information type
and its recipient.' 2 ' In 2000, President Bill Clinton vetoed legislation that
would have become, its opponents claimed, an equivalent of an official
secrets statute. 22 Specifically, the Intelligence Authorization Act would
have made it a federal felony for officers, employees, and former
118. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that other intangible interests, such as an interest
in exclusive control over one's business assets, might constitute "property" for purposes of a
criminal statute, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See Scheidler
v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2003) (holding that, even though under
RICO, private abortion clinics might have a"property" interest in exercising exclusive control over
their business assets the anti-abortion activists did not obtain this property right by shutting down
abortion clinics).
119. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 137.
120. See Official Secrets Act, 1989, c. 6 (Eng.).
121. OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, supra note 5 (stating that, in the United States,
"there is no single statute that provides criminal penalties for all types of unauthorized disclosures
of classified information").
122. See President's Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives
the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001," 36 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2784
(Nov. 13, 2000). Subsequently, Congress removed the challenged provision from the legislation
and the President signed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 into law. See
President's Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 36
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 3 184 (Jan. 1,2001) (praising the fact "the Act no longer contains the
badly flawed provision that would have made a felony of unauthorized disclosures of classified
information, and that was the basis for my veto of a previous version of this legislation"). See also
146 CONG. REC. H9856 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Pelosi). During the House
hearings, Rep. Pelosi argued that the initial version of the Intelligence Authorization Act "would
for the first time in our history enact an official secrets law." Id.
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employees of the U.S. government to knowingly disclose or attempt to
disclose "any classified information" to a person who was not authorized
to receive that information.'23
The Intelligence Authorization Act was initially introduced by
Alabama Senator Richard Shelby'24 and subsequently incorporated in the
House CIA appropriations bill for the 2001 fiscal year. 2 The most striking
feature of the bill's passage was that neither the House nor the Senate held
public hearings on the bill, and congressional committees on the judiciary
never considered the proposed legislation.2 6 The only congressional
committees that considered the bill were the Senate Committees on
Intelligence, 27 Armed Forces,' 28 and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. 29 This clandestine way of passing the bill
drew sharp criticism from Representative Conyers of Michigan, who said
on the House floor that "the reason that we are doing it this sneaky way
[sic] is because [the bill] will scare the bejesus [sic] out of whistle
blowers." 30

123. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, H.R. 4392,106th Cong. § 303(a)
(2000). Specifically, H.R. 4392 stated:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States, a former or retired
officer or employee of the United States, any other person with authorized access
to classified information, or any other person formerly with authorized access to
classified information, knowingly and willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose,
any classified information acquired as a result of such person's authorized access
to classified information to a person (other than an officer or employee of the
United States) who is not authorized access to such classified information....
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.... The
term "classified information" means information or material property classified
and clearly marked or represented, or that the person knows or has reason to
believe has been properly classified by appropriate authorities, pursuant to the
provisions of a statute or Executive Order, as requiring protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.
Id.
124. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2507, 106th Cong. (2000).
125. H.R.4392.
126. 146 Cong. Rec. H9857 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("The
history of this provision... is that it was dropped quietly into a Senate version and has never had
hearings in the House or the Senate, no hearings on a provision that has the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Committee on the Judiciary."); see also 146 Cong. Rec. H9859 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000)
(statement of Rep. Barr) ("This legislation contains a provision that will create, make no mistake
about it, with not one day of hearings, without one moment of public debate, without one witness,
an official secrets act.").
127. See S. REP. No. 106-279, at 1-3 (2000).
128. See S. REP. No. 106-325, at 1-2 (2000).
129. See H.R. REP. No. 106-620, at 1 (2000).
130. 146 Cong. Rec. H9858 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
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It was the bill's failure to account for the situations in which leaks of
confidential government information would expose the government's
wrongdoing that ultimately defeated its enactment into law. For instance,
Representative Pelosi of California argued that the bill placed too much
discretion in the hands of the executive branch by defining "classified
information" as any information "properly classified... pursuant to the
provisions of a statute or Executive Order."'' An executive order currently
prohibits classification of information in order to conceal violations of law,
inefficiency or administrative error, or to prevent embarrassment to the
government. 3 Pelosi warned, however, that if future presidents remove
this prohibition, the bill would enable the government to imprison even
those people who were trying to expose government corruption. 133 "The
Congress is foolish in my view ...to give a blank check to the executive
34
branch for prosecutions in this important area," Pelosi said.
Representative Barr of Georgia echoed Pelosi's concerns by urging House
members not to pass the bill and reminding them about this nation's
"regard for constitutional civil liberties,... the [F]irst [A]mendment, and
our belief that before the government can put somebody in jail for
following their conscience and disclosing information showing
government wrongdoing, the government must shoulder a heavy
burden."' 35
Several members of Congress also expressed concern that the bill could
have exposed the media to criminal liability for investigating government
misdeeds.136 For instance, Representative Pelosi also argued that the bill
would have enabled prosecutors "to haul" reporters before grand juries and
force them to reveal their sources. 137 She contended that reporters could be
3
found criminally liable for soliciting someone to violate the law.' 1
Similarly, Representative Dixon stated that, by potentially limiting the
media's freedom, the bill endangered "the ability of the public to remain

131. Intelligence Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2001, H.R. 4392,106th Cong. (2000); see also
146 Cong. Rec. H9856 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Pelosi).
132. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,829 (Apr. 20, 1995).
133. See 146 Cong. Rec. H9856 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Pelosi).
134. Id.
135. Id. at H9859 (statement of Rep. Barr).
136. See, e.g., id. at H9856, H9859 (statements of Rep. Pelosi and Rep. Barr).
137. See id. at H9856 (statement of Rep. Pelosi). Specifically, Rep. Pelosi stated that she saw
"nothing [in the provisions of the bill] to prevent reporters from being hauled in before grand juries
and being forced to reveal their sources." Id.
138. See id. ("[W]e do not each know how this leaks law would interact with criminal laws
on conspiracy, aiding and abetting, solicitation and the like.").
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informed about matters of
critical public interest which often relate to
' 39
governmental misdeeds.'
President Clinton summarized some of the congressional concerns in
the message accompanying his veto of the Intelligence Authorization
Act. 4° The President explained that he vetoed the proposed legislation
"because of one badly flawed provision" that was "overbroad and [could]
unnecessarily chill legitimate activities that are at the heart of a
democracy."'' Specifically, the President stated that the bill "might
discourage [g]overnment officials from engaging even in appropriate
public discussion, press briefings, or other legitimate activities."' 42 The
President also stated that the bill may unduly restrain the ability of former
government officials to teach, write, or engage in4 3any activity aimed at
building public understanding of complex issues.
The criticism behind the presidential veto of the Intelligence
Authorization Act, together with congressional concerns about the bill,
explain why the United States has never enacted a blanket prohibition
against all unauthorized leaks of confidential government information.
First, there is a fear that the government, under the disguise of national
security concerns, would seek to shield unfavorable or embarrassing
information from public scrutiny. Second, this nation has a long-standing
tradition of supporting the press and its ability to rely on inside sources in
conducting investigations of government misconduct.
B. Specific CriminalStatutes ProvidingSanctions Against
Leaks of Government Information
The absence of an official secrets act in the United States does not
mean that all unauthorized disclosures of government confidences go
unpunished. To the contrary, the United States has an elaborate scheme of
narrowly drawn statutes that proscribe leaks of government information
under circumstances that are deemed to pose the greatest security risks.
These statutes usually provide penalties for: (1) the unauthorized
disclosure of specific types of government information or (2) disclosures
made to specific recipients, usually foreign governments.
For instance, the Internal Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 783, provides
criminal sanctions against government employees who disclose classified

139. Id. at H9854 (statement of Rep. Dixon).
140. See President's Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives
the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001," 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2784
(Nov. 13, 2000).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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information to representatives of foreign governments.' 44 The Espionage

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 794, on the other hand, imposes criminal sanctions,
including the death penalty, on any person who discloses information
"relating to the national defense," and has reason to believe that such
information would be used "to the injury of the United States, or to the
advantage of any foreign nation.' 45 Criminal laws also prohibit leaks of
the following specific types of government information, among others:
graphical representations "of ...vital military or naval installations or
equipment"; 46 information relating to cryptographic systems and
"communication intelligence activities" of the United States and foreign
governments; 147 "official diplomatic code"; 148 data concerning atomic
144. See 50 U.S.C. § 783 (2002):
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States . . . to
communicate.., to any other person whom such officer or employee knows or
has reason to believe to be an agent or representative of any foreign government,
any information of a kind which shall have been classified by the President ...as
affecting the security of the United States, knowing or having reason to know that
such information has been so classified. . . .Any person who violates any
provision of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of
not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by both.

145. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2002):
Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or
transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign
government.., information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by
death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life ....
See also id. § 793 (2003):
Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being
entrusted with ...information relating to the national defense which information
the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States
or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers,
transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to
communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or
transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it ...Shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

146. Id.§ 797 (2002) ("Whoever reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away any photograph,
sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of the vital military or naval installations
or equipment... without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer.., shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.").
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weapons and nuclear material,' 49 and classified information identifying
' 50
U.S. "undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants and sources."'

147. Id.§ 798(a) (2002):
Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or
otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any
manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit
of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified
information... (1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher,
or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government, or... (3)
concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any
foreign government... Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both.

148. Id.§ 952 (2002) states in relevant part:
Whoever, by virtue of his employment by the United States, obtains from another
or has. . . access to, any official diplomatic code or any matter prepared in any
such code .. .and without authorization or competent authority, willfully
publishes or furnishes to another any such code or matter... shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

149. See 42 U.S.C. § 2277 (2002):
Whoever, being or having been an employee.., of any agency of the United
States ...or whoever conspires to communicate or to receive, any Restricted
Data, knowing or having reason to believe that such data is Restricted Data, to any
person not authorized to receive Restricted Data... knowing or having reason to
believe such person is not so authorized to receive Restricted Data shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punishable by a fine of not more than $12,500.
See also id. § 2 01 4 (y) (2002) ("The term "Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1) design,
manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or
(3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy.").
150. 50 U.S.C. § 421(a) (2002):
Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified information that
identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identifying such
covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information,
knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the
United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under Title 18 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
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In 2002, Congress expanded this list by passing the Homeland Security
Act.' 5' The Act provides criminal sanctions for the unauthorized disclosure
of "any critical infrastructure information"'' 2 defined as "information not
customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical
infrastructure or protected systems."' 53
In addition to criminal penalties, government employees who leak
confidential government information face a number of administrative
sanctions. For instance, a long-standing presidential executive order
provides for the discharge of government employees who publish
classified information. '5'
Also, in 2002, Congress passed the U.S.A. Patriot
Act providing administrative sanctions against the unauthorized disclosure
of information by "investigative [and] law enforcement officer[s].'
The existence of this elaborate statutory scheme, .coupled with
Congress' reluctance to enact an official secrets statute, explains why
courts should not use a criminal anti-theft statute to uphold convictions for
leaks of confidential government information. First, the presidential veto
of the Intelligence Authorization Act establishes that a blanket prohibition
against the unauthorized disclosure of confidential government
information is not currently on the books in the United States.'56 The
President explained that he vetoed the legislation not because it was
superfluous and unnecessary in view of already existing criminal laws.'57
To the contrary, the President stated that the passage of such legislation
would contradict this country's historical commitment to civil freedoms
including the freedom of speech and of the press.' Consequently, a
judicial interpretation of § 641 that makes possible prosecutions for any
unauthorized use of confidential government information would contradict
the message of the presidential veto. The broad interpretation of § 641 is
arguably an act of judicial activism that creates by operation of law what
has been rejected by operation of the legislative process.

151. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
152. Id. § 214(f).
153. Id. § 212(3).
154. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (June 28, 1978).
155. U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 223(a)(3), § 2520(g) 115 Stat. 272
(2001) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2520(g)) ("Any willful disclosure or use by an investigative
or law enforcement officer or governmental entity of information . ..is a violation of this
chapter ...").
156. Cf President's Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives
the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001," 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2784
(Nov. 4, 2000).
157. See id.
158. See id. (stating that the challenged legislative provision failed to balance the
government's interest in protecting "vital information from improper disclosure" against "the rights
of citizens to receive the information necessary for democracy to work").
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Second, it is at least arguable that, by enacting a number of the
narrowly-drawn criminal statutes addressing leaks of particular types of
government information, Congress has expressed its intent not to provide
a blanket prohibition against all unauthorized disclosures of government
secrets. This inference also is based on the canon of statutory construction:
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius.Expression of the one is exclusion
of the other."1" 9 Arguably, under this canon, existence of explicit statutory
prohibitions against some unauthorized disclosures of government secrets
means that all other unauthorized leaks are not to be criminally punished.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST APPLICATION OF A CRIMINAL
ANTI-THEFT STATUTE TO LEAKS OF CONFIDENTIAL
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

A. Over-Deterrence of Beneficial SocialActivities
There are several policy reasons for preferring a narrow judicial
interpretation of criminal anti-theft statutes, such as § 641. For instance,
it has been suggested that courts, in criminal cases, are unlikely to consider
the policy implications of recognizing property rights in information. Also,
the harsh criminal penalties may discourage socially beneficial
activities.1 60 In vetoing the Intelligence Authorization Act, the President
cautioned that the blanket prohibition against all leaks of government
information could deter more conduct than6 is necessary to serve the
government's legitimate interest in secrecy.' '
For instance, such a prohibition could deter government employees
from speaking to the press. 62 Who would want to risk jail-time by
answering a reporter's question? Even if a government employee gave an
interview, wouldn't that employee err on a side of caution by withholding
even the information that the public has a legitimate interest in
knowing? 163 In fact, this is exactly what the government seeks to achieve
by prosecuting leaks of government information under § 641. William S.
Duffey, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, said that
159. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25
(1997).
160. See Moohr, supra note 69, at 686.
161. See President's Message on Returning Without Approval to the House ofRepresentatives
the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001," 36 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2784
(Nov. 13, 2000) (stating that there was "a serious risk that this legislation would tend to have
chilling effect on those who engage in legitimate activities").
162. See id.(stating that a threat of criminal prosecution "might discourage Government
officials from engaging even in appropriate public discussion, press briefings, or other legitimate
official activities").
163. See id.
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Jonathan Randel's one-year jail sentence "stands as a warning to
government employees .. .who might consider providing sensitive
government information
to anyone, including journalists, outside of the
164
federal government."'

Meanwhile, there are circumstances in which society may want
government employees to breach their duty of confidentiality to expose
government wrongdoing. For instance, one of Time magazine's "Persons
of the Year" was a government whistle blower-FBI staff attorney Coleen
Rowley' 65-who, in the summer of 2002, testified in a nationally televised
congressional hearing that the FBI higher-ups ignored her office's
investigation into a terrorist co-conspirator. 166 Arguably, under a broad
construction of § 641, the government could have prosecuted Rowley for
breaching her duty of confidentiality and disclosing,
without authorization,
67
information.
enforcement
law
confidential
Another problem with criminalizing all leaks of confidential
government information is that "good motives" are usually not a defense
in criminal law. 68 As long as the mens rea requirement of a particular
crime is met-and § 641 requires a knowing violation of the law-a
person may be found guilty regardless of any altruistic motives for his

164. McDonald, supra note 7; see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Former DEA
Worker Sentenced to Prison For Selling Information (Jan. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/press/01 -09-03_2.htm.
165. See Amanda Ripley & Maggie Sieger, Persons of the Year: The Special Agent, TIME,
Dec. 30, 2002, at 34.
166. See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Traces of Terror: The CongressionalHearings:
Whistle-Blower Recounts FaultsInside the FBI, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2002, at Al. Many FBI agents
disapproved of Rowley's public criticism of the FBI's activities. For instance, Charles George,
president of the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, wrote in the society's newsletter that
Rowley's behavior was "unthinkable." Ripley & Sieger, supra note 165. Specifically, George stated
that any criticism should have been addressed through the agency's chain of command, not in public.
Id.; see also Dan Eggen, FBI Whistle-Blower's CaseReexamined, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,2002, at A2.
In March 2003, Rowley once again publicly criticized the U.S. governmental policy by giving
the New York Times and the Star Tribune copies of a letter she sent to FBI Director Robert Mueller.
Greg Gordon & David Chanen, FBI Whistle-Blower Is Reassigned, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis,
MN), Mar. 21, 2003, at lB. In the letter, Rowley "expressed fear that a war with Iraq would lead
to a flood of terrorism on a scale the bureau is unprepared to handle." Id. One of the former FBI
agents from Rowley's office claimed that, by sending the letter to the press, "Rowley 'breached'
the confidentiality that goes with her job as legal adviser." Id.
167. Jonathan Randel's lawyer claimed that, just like Rowley, Randel had benign motives in
sharing DEA's confidential information with The London Times. See McDonald, supra note 7.
Specifically, Randel claimed that he thought that Lord Ashcroft, who was in the center of The
London Times' investigation, "was getting a free ride for crooked activities." Id. "Money had
nothing to do with it," Randel's lawyer stated. Id.
168. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 140 (stating that, "[h]owever noble the motive for this
employee's conduct, good motives do not excuse embezzlement" and conversion under either the
federal mail fraud statute or § 641).
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actions. In addition, § 641 has no de minimis exception. 169 Consequently,
even minor and insignificant leaks to the press could expose a government
70
employee to criminal sanctions for theft of government property. 1
In the end, it would be left to the government's sole discretion to decide
whether to prosecute a specific case. 17' Government officials often
purposefully leak information to the press. 171 Consequently, it would be up
to the government prosecutors to decide what leaks are good leaks and
should be tolerated; and what leaks are bad leaks and should be
prosecuted. By exercising this prosecutorial discretion, the government
might seek to cover up its own wrongdoing and incompetence. Also, if the
government has a strong political agenda, there is a danger that people
may be prosecuted on account of their political beliefs; the government
could selectively prosecute those government employees who express
opposing political views.
B. Abridgment of Media Freedoms
Courts generally recognize that the application of § 641 to leaks of
government information implicates First Amendment freedoms. 173 First,
the law may deter government employees from releasing information that
169. Id. at 129 (stating that, unlike other federal criminal statutes, the federal mail fraud statute
and § 641 include no concept of a de minimis violation).
170. At the same time, criminal law usually allows for a justification defense, in which a
defendant could claim that his conduct, even though illegal, was justifiable because it furthered an
important public interest. See PAuL ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 475,(2d ed.
1995). For instance, a government employee who leaks confidential information to the press may
argue that the public's benefit from learning about the government's activities outweighs any
detriment that the government might suffer as a result of the disclosure. To date, however, none of
the cases involving prosecutions for leaks of government information considered the justification
defense. The lack of precedent, however, does not mean that in future cases that involve a more
sympathetic set of circumstances, a defendant could not use the justification defense.
171. See Nimmer, supra note 14, at 322 (warning that a broad interpretation of § 641 might
enable government officials to exercise "uncontrolled discretion"); see also Coffee, supra note 13,
at 129 (stating that "[aill that keeps a trivial act of disloyalty from being deemed a federal felony
is the tender mercy of the federal prosecutor-who sometimes has his own reasons to pursue small
or technical violations").
172. See Nelson, supranote I (stating that the Bush administration "has followed tradition and
leaked national security secrets to serve its own political or policy purposes. It has repeatedly
leaked classified information to the media about plans for war with Iraq and to paint a positive
picture about its war on terror.").
173. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, 836 F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that
application of § 641 to information leaks might present the "[F]irst [A]mendment problems");
United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 925 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that the imprecise language of
§ 641 "threatens to impringe upon rights protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment); United States v.
Lambert, 446 F. Supp. 890, 898 (D. Conn. 1978) (stating that § 641 touched "a sensitive
constitutional area" and that "the government's interest in secrecy must in every case be carefully
balanced against the First Amendment interest in disclosure").
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"forms the basis of much of the discussion of public issues.' 74 Second, the
statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who receives government
property "with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have
been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted."' 175 If unauthorized
disclosure of confidential government information constitutes
"conversion" for purposes of § 641, then reporters who obtain such
information with knowledge
of its confidential status become potential
76
criminal defendants.1
In addition, if an unauthorized disclosure of confidential government
information is a federal felony under § 641, then members of the media
may become criminally liable for aiding and abetting the commission of
that felony. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2 imposes criminal punishment on
anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" an
offense against the United States. 177 Arguably, reporters who seek
interviews with government employees, and, by questioning, encourage
the employees to divulge confidential government information, can be said
to "aid and abet" or to "induce" the commission of an offense.
At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that, in this country, the
media performs a watch-dog function by, among other things, conducting
investigations into government corruption and wrongdoing. 171 Such
investigations would not be possible if all that was available to the media
were official press releases and the self-interested statements of
government bureaucrats.' 79 Members of the media routinely interview
sources inside the government to receive the most accurate and current
information on governmental activities. To impose criminal sanctions on
the media for performing their job would clearly contradict the
constitutional mandate not to abridge the freedom of the press.
All this is not to say that media may never be found criminally liable
for publishing government secrets in violation of specific statutory
prohibitions. To the contrary, the Supreme Court made it clear in New

174. Truong, 629 F.2d at 925.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2003).
176. See 146 Cong. Rec. H9856 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Pelosi).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2002) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.").
178. See DONALD GILLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 457 (5th ed. 1990) (stating

that "if it is the natural tendency of government to compile and conceal information, it is the role
of the press to dig it out and put it into circulation"); see generally TIMOTHY GLEASON, THE
WATCHDOG CONCEPT (1990).

179. See Scott Henry, The Weekly Scalawag:Drug EnforcementAgency: ForChippingAway
at Democracy, CREATIVE LOAFING OF ATLANTA (Jan. 29, 2003), available at
http://atlanta.creativeloafing.com/2003-01-29/news-scalawag.html (stating that "[i]fjoumalists had
to rely on press conferences and official news releases for their scoops, we may as well all move
to Pyongyang [sic]").
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York Times Co. v. United States' that the media may face subsequent
criminal penalties for divulging classified government information to the
detriment of the country's national security interests.' 8' However,
imposition of criminal sanctions under § 641 arguably endangers the First
Amendment interests much more than imposition of penalties under the
more specific and narrowly-drawn prohibitions of the Espionage Act and
Internal Security Act. If courts broadly construe § 641 to prohibit all leaks
of confidential government information, the media would be prevented
from performing their public function-even in situations in which the
82
national security interests of the United States are not at stake.
Consequently, a broad interpretation of § 641 would tilt the balance
between the government's interest in secrecy and the public's interest in
being informed about government activities in the government's favor.8 3
VI. CONCLUSION

This Note demonstrates that it is still unclear whether the government
holds a property interest in confidential government information and, if it
does, whether that interest is protected by the anti-theft provisions of
criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 641. Neither criminal statutes nor
the relevant case law give definite answers to these questions. As a result,
the outcome of future cases involving leaks of confidential government
information remains unclear, and there is a potential danger that the broad
construction of 18 U.S.C. §641 could unduly restrict the legitimate speech

180. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
181. Specifically, Justices White and Steward stated in their concurring opinion that
newspapers are not immune from criminal sanctions if they publish classified government
documents. See id. at 733.
182. See Nimmer, supra note 14, at 322 (arguing that prosecution of information leaks under
§ 641 would be unconstitutional because it would impose criminal sanctions for reproduction of
"government documents without reference to whether any such reproduction would be injurious
to the national security or to any other legitimate governmental interest").
183. Imposition of criminal sanctions on the unauthorized disclosure of a wide range of
government information is all the more troublesome because, in the context of criminal cases,
courts are unlikely to engage in public policy discussions and to carefully balance the public's right
to know against the government's interest in secrecy. The chances are that, unless the criminal
provision is struck on its face as constitutionally overbroad, media defendants would incur criminal
liability just like any other member of the public. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691
(1972) (stating that, "[iut would be frivolous to assert... that the First Amendment, in the interest
of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to violate
valid criminal laws. Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy
information, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the
impact on the flow ofnews."); see also United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 347, 352 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding that no First Amendment defense existed to child pornography charges and that
knowing conduct was the only scienter necessary for conviction under the relevant criminal
statute).
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of government employees and impede media investigations into
government misconduct.
To dissipate this uncertainty, Congress could amend 18 U.S.C. § 641
to state specifically whether the statute should apply to an unauthorized
disclosure of government information. In the absence of a specific
congressional mandate, this Note urges the courts to construe the criminal
anti-theft statutes narrowly by not applying them to leaks of government
information. Only by employing a narrow interpretation can courts secure
this country's long-standing commitment to the freedom of speech and of
the press.
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